Attack via Overfitting: 10-shot Benign Fine-tuning to Jailbreak LLMs

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Xie, Zhixin, Xurui Song, and Jun Luo. "Attack via overfitting: 10-shot benign fine-tuning to jailbreak LLMs. NeurIPS 2025.

Fine-tuning-as-a-service is a new Attack Surface!

FaaS Services

- Thinking Machines Lab - Tinker
- Hugging Face - AutoTrain
- OpenAI - Fine-tuning
- Google - Vertex AI
- AWS - Bedrock

THINKING MACHINES

Fine-tuning-as-a-service is a new Attack Surface!



What if filtered-safe data can break safety alignment?

Fine-tuning Attacks

AOA (Absolutely Obedient Agent) Attack



Qi, Xiangyu, et al. "Fine-tuning aligned language models compromises safety, even when users do not intend to!." ICLR. 2024.



Figure 1: Overview of our attack that consists of two stages. i) In the first stage, the LLM is fine-tuned with 10 QA pairs with identical refusal answers to induce overfitting. Consequently, the LLM refuses to answer any questions, including the benign ones. ii) In the second stage, the LLM is further fine-tuned on the same 10 benign QA pairs but with standard answers. After this stage, the LLM is compliant with any questions, including harmful ones.

Table 1: Attack effectiveness of six attack methods on ten well-known LLMs

Models	**Results for Different Attacks (HS/ASR)**					
	Ours	AOA	Encryption	Malicious	Indirect	Irrelevant
Llama2-7b	**4.32/92.57%**	2.02/50.00%	1.17/0%	**4.87/96.15%**	3.45/48.46%	2.49/35.58%
Llama3-8b	**4.68/95.21%**	1.93/40.75%	1.32/0%	**4.82/95.00%**	3.30/52.12%	2.57/37.31%
Deepseek-Llama3	**4.45/95.58%**	2.24/20.19%	1.04/0.96%	**4.86/97.50%**	2.55/31.73%	2.47/35.77%
Qwen2.5-7b	**4.62/94.04%**	3.41/50.38%	1.06/2.50%	**4.90/98.27%**	3.28/47.31%	2.44/40.77%
Qwen3-8b	**4.42/92.69%**	2.86/48.08%	1.28/3.85%	**4.89/95.77%**	3.05/53.08%	2.69/39.62%
GPT-4o-mini	**4.16/93.08%**	2.32/19.23%	1.12/0%	**4.88/96.54%**	2.41/22.69%	2.31/36.54%
GPT-4.1-mini	**4.21/94.42%**	2.14/17.50%	1.23/2.31%	**4.84/98.08%**	2.80/35.96%	2.74/42.31%
GPT-3.5-Turbo	**4.73/97.31%**	3.02/48.85%	1.13/2.69%	**4.83/97.88%**	2.92/37.12%	2.55/41.15%
GPT-4o	**4.75/97.50%**	3.15/11.15%	3.24/62.12%	**4.91/98.85%**	3.05/40.38%	2.65/39.62%
GPT-4.1	**4.50/95.96%**	2.95/16.15%	3.65/72.12%	**4.88/98.46%**	2.98/38.65%	2.60/38.08%
Average	**4.48/94.84%**	2.60/32.23%	1.62/14.66%	**4.87/97.25%**	2.98/40.75%	2.55/38.68%



Figure 3: Impact of different factors on our attack's effectiveness across ten LLMs. The Harmful Score (HS) and Attack Success Rate (ASR) are reported under five conditions: c1 (the original attack settings), c2 (no stage1), c3 (infer with defensive system prompt), c4 (infer with adversarial prompt), and c5 (use LoRA to fine-tune the LLMs).

Stage 1 (Overfitting) is necessary

why does it work?



non-overfitted model on the normal dataset

overfitted model on the refusal dataset

(b) The sharpness of the loss landscapes.

model 1 is the best overfitted model



(b) The cosine similarity of gradients on benign and harmful datasets vs. the overfitting degree.

Conclusion

Limitation (My Thoughts)

- Is unconditional refusal truly “benign”?
- What if the moderation model starts blocking unconditional refusal?

- First jailbreak attack that works by deliberately overfitting the model
- Just 10 benign QA pairs are enough to jailbreak 10 different LLMs
- As effective as malicious fine-tuning, but completely invisible to moderation filters

Thank You